The Commission of Inquiry’s Conclusions, By Moshe Feiglin (Israel National News)
This author is a long-time and devoted supporter of Moshe Feiglin and Manhigut Yehudit. This blog has had numerous posts endorsing Moshe, Manhigut Yehudit and it’s positions on various issues.
Lest anyone have any doubts, this dissent is expressed out of unity and out of support for the goals Manhigut Yehudit has put forth, “to make Israel the authentic Jewish homeland… — an Israel motivated and governed by Jewish values and love for every Jew.”
That having been said and established, this author feels compelled to express some points both related to Moshe’s article and related to recent articles and discussions regarding military service by religious soldiers.
The Commission of Inquiry’s Conclusions;
F. It soon became apparent that from the borders of withdrawal, the IDF cannot even defend the lives of its own soldiers.
G. The abduction of the soldiers threatened the Withdrawal and Convergence concept – the horse upon which Olmert rode to the premiership.
H. That is why Olmert hurried out to war. This was a war to prove Israel’s ability to defend itself after unilateral withdrawal. In short, it was a war to save the Convergence Plan. That is why the Left supported the war even more than the Right.
Conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry
A. The war was not fought to protect northern Israel from the Hizbullah’s rockets. On the contrary, the war is what caused them to be fired.
B. The goal of the war was patently political – to defend the concept of unilateral withdrawal, the Convergence Plan and Olmert’s government.
C. If Israel’s entire political and military elite that was involved in any way with unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and Gush Katif is not immediately replaced, then Israel’s existence is gravely endangered.
Notwithstanding Olmert’s incompetent handling of the war on the northern front and his ridiculous boasts, spins and historical revisionism, it is incomprehensible that this war could have been initiated purely to defend Olmert’s convergence dogma, and not out of asserting Israel’s military power to insure the security of it’s citizens from missile attacks, both by Kassams in the south and katushyas in the north and in order rectify the security lapses which resulted in the kidnappings of the 3 Israeli soldiers.
One cannot argue the point that the grunts and their immediate commanders DID NOT lose the war on the Lebanon front. One also cannot argue the point, as Caroline Glick puts it, that “the Israeli government, in the interest of its narrow and misguided political agenda, is denying the IDF the resources needed for victory.” Also valid is the point that top IDF command was malfeasant placing other interests above providing leadership at moment when Hezbollah’s kidnapping of IDF soldiers Goldwasser and Regev occurred which resulted in the launching of the war in the north as well as at the crucial onset of the war and in the military’s coordination with the government throughout the war as to it’s conduct.
But as “evil spirited” as Olmert and Halutz are, in a war which became a battle for the cities, towns and homes in the north, it is as incumbent upon soldiers to be at their posts, to go to where assigned to fight and to give their all in a war of survival, regardless of political agenda, as it was or should have been last year to disobey the immoral order to expell fellow Jews from their homes, neighborhoods, towns in Gush Katif or the 4 Shomron towns.
During the fighting, this author advocated winning the war first and then dealing with Olmert and Halutz and their agendas afterwards in the media and in the state investigations which would have surely developed, if only for the governmental and military circumstances which led to the conflict and it’s conduct from the onset. These circumstances include, but are not limited to the both the governmental and military leadership deficiences of neglect and complacency which made it possible for both Hamas and Hezbollah to kidnap IDF soldiers as well as the neglect and complacency bordering on dereliction which enabled free smuggling of weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah and the resultant accumulation of 10s of thousands of weapons, rockets, rocket launchers over the past year in Gaza and over the past 6 years in Lebanon. As things occurred, the result was less than a winning one, all the more reason for a commission of investigation.
The government’s conduct of the war in Lebanon was very much subject to the agenda of spinning validation of convergence seems obvious — from the delay in committing large numbers of ground forces to what was apparently flawed deployment which lacked both mobility and efficiency in conducting house-to-house fighting.
In the humble opinion of this author, it is agreed that “If Israel’s entire political and military elite that was involved in any way with unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and Gush Katif is not immediately replaced, then Israel’s existence is gravely endangered.”
However, it seems that the proper approach to be advocated must be 2-tiered.
1/ When a teen reaches military age, if the same political and military rot remains in place, the teen would be justified in not signing up or enlisting.
2/ For that person already in the military, he must act with a sense of morality as to obeying orders, not obeying orders which are blatantly immoral, i.e. expelling and displacing his fellow Jew from his home, community or town.
To advocate dessertion or AWOL during a war in defense of one’s fellow Jews; their homes, communities, cities and towns can only be reckless and dangerous for the nation’s survival. MB