Is Olmert Intellectually Equipped to Internalize and Re-Think ‘Convergence’ Based on the ‘Disengagement’ Lessons and Realities? To Swallow His Arrogance in the National Interest?

Disengagement Lessons

Excerpts;

Eight months after the withdrawal from Gaza, or what was referred to as a “unilateral disengagement,” things are not developing according to the early scenario marketed to the public.

Almost nothing has materialized in the way pullout supporters promised us would happen.

Did Israel gain from the disengagement? Less than what its planners hoped. The United States didn’t grant us even one cent in economic aid, even though in various phases of preparation for the withdrawal and upon the pullout, much was said about a special USD 2 billion grant. As of today, there’s no grant.

For a short while, Israel enjoyed international sympathy, with the pullout perceived as the start of a large-scale unilateral withdrawal. Yet the sympathy is slowly evaporating, particularly following Ariel Sharon’s illness.

Ehud Olmert may discover that the attitude to a Sharon-made disengagement is very different than the world’s approach to an Olmert-made one. The first one fascinated the world because it appeared to be a personal sea change by a hawkish leader tired of war. The second one, Olmert’s pullout, would look like – and already looks like – as an act by a centrist politician whose party received about a quarter of the vote in the recent elections.

The Qassams, of course, do not constitute a danger to Israel, but they’re bothersome, annoying, and made the daily life of Gaza-area residents very difficult. And dangerous. Eventually, even if only due to the laws of probability, a rocket would land in a crowd concentration and lead to disaster.

The disengagement did not cause a rift within Israel society and didn’t lead to one kind of self-reflection or another. Eight months later, its memory is vague and its lessons unclear. We prefer not to talk about it and not to mention it.

Was there a disengagement? Was there a (Gaza settlement of) Netzarim? The fact that the post-disengagement reality does not resemble the earlier scenarios and predictions should make Ehud Olmert rethink his diplomatic plans.

Would Israel really be able to unilaterally set its border vis-a-vis the Palestinians, a border they or the world would not accept? Would Israel be able to “converge” into “settlement blocs” in the West Bank and annex them? Who would finance such a move, which would cost tens of billions of shekels and not be perceived as a solution to anything? Who would prevent a tragic rift among the people? And what would be left behind in Palestine following a pretend-Israeli-withdrawal coupled with pretend-annexation?

Eight months after disengagement, the pregnancy only gave rise to question marks.