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Commentary;
Tucked deep inside the Haaretz news website and inaccessible to anyone looking for it from the front page or from the opinion page,
the Haaretz editorial below, author unnamed, echos what David Horovitz wrote yesterday and which this blog posted, but in even more stark terms such that one has to wonder how it is that editor David “Wet Dream about the Rape of Israel” Landau permitted it to run. The piece obviously seems to run counter to his agenda.
And beneath the hidden editorial is a more accessable Haaretz piece delivering more of the same message. But the great mystery of life is
how Haaretz could be so stark in now calling for Olmert’s ouster. How does this editorial jive with Haaretz’s standing in the MSM which etrogizes Olmert as long as he remains a “good boy” and gives up everything — including Jerusalem. MB
Worse Than the Partial Report
( Haaretz Editorial)
Full Text;
Because they were so preoccupied with the final 60 hours of the war, and because of the fact that the Winograd Committee exonerated Ehud Olmert from an implied accusation that he decided on a ground operation at the last moment only in order to improve his political position, people seem to have failed to hear the extraordinarily serious remarks read out by Judge Eliyahu Winograd in his summarizing announcement to the public. The blood libel against Olmert was removed from the agenda, but on the other hand, the committee declared him unfit to conduct a war.
The prime minister has no reason to rejoice, certainly not to drink a toast, and it is doubtful whether he has a right even to breathe a small sigh of relief. The final Winograd report is worse than the partial one because it asserts that after the failure of the first days, no conclusions were drawn, no changes were made, there was no improvement in either the level of decision making or in the performance of the government or the Israel Defense Forces, and all this in spite of the fact that the government and the military command had 34 days to pull themselves together.
The IDF’s advantage vis-a-vis a small fighting organization was not exploited. Israel did not win. The government did not choose between the two operational military alternatives on the agenda – a short and painful blow, or a thorough ground operation – but instead equivocated and let itself be “dragged” until the end of the war. The level of decision-making on all levels: political, military and the interface between them, was unacceptable.
The war was a “serious missed opportunity,” which ended without an Israeli victory even though Israel had everything it needed to win. The IDF did not provide a solution to the rocket fire, the fabric of life in the north of the country was disrupted, and all these findings are “very troubling,” as the committee says, because of their far-reaching implications for Israel and the entire region.
At no stage were strategic thinking and planning in evidence, the war’s management was flawed, performance was flawed and there was no intelligent and effective use of the power at the country’s disposal. The IDF failed, says the committee, but the blame cannot necessarily be placed on the army, and the political echelon cannot be absolved of responsibility.
“The final Winograd report… asserts that after the failure of the first days, no conclusions were drawn, no changes were made, there was no improvement in either the level of decision making or in the performance of the government… in spite of the fact that the government and the military command had 34 days to pull themselves together.”
In the short announcement to the public, the committee repeatedly emphasized the failure of the political echelon, the military echelon and the interface between them. The IDF did not provide the political leadership with a suitable military achievement, and responsibility for this outcome lies mainly with the IDF, “but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals set by the political echelon share responsibility.”
The committee also considers the final ground operation a failure, although the decision to embark on a ground attack was “almost inevitable” in light of the fact that Katyushas continued to fall on Israel and Hezbollah was seen as the victor. But here too, at the final stage, there were no serious consultations, the question as to whether there was a reasonable chance of achieving something was not asked, there was no follow-up of the details of the fighting on the part of the political leadership, and it is not at all clear how and when the decision to stop the operation was made.
The committee asserts that Israel lost the war with Hezbollah. It lost due to flawed management rather than objective circumstances, since it embarked on the war out of choice, at a time that it determined. The abstract of the final Winograd report points to a prime minister who lacks the ability to conduct a country at war.
Who Will Trust Him in the Next War, by Orit Shochat (Haaretz)
Full Text;
It isn’t because Prime Minister Ehud Olmert failed in managing the war that he has to go; after all, no governmental or military action is guaranteed to succeed. There is also no reason to punish him for his mistakes; leaders may err. The reason the prime minister must be replaced is his incompetence.
This conclusion is written across the hundreds of pages of the Winograd Report, in various forms. The fact that Olmert is quite pleased with the report shows that he has failed to understand it. At the very least, he should have said: “I failed.” Instead, Olmert is sending condolences to bereaved families and hugging Israel Defense Forces soldiers. This is the stuff politicians are made from, not leaders. It will be hard to trust Olmert in the next war, and the fact that 60 percent of the public wants him to resign shows that things look different outside the television and radio studios. In light of his conduct throughout the war, it also is doubtful whether Olmert can be trusted to handle peace negotiations. It comes as no surprise that the Winograd Committee hinted that not a lot has been repaired since the interim report was published, and that the State Comptroller’s Report on the home front did not really make much of an impression on the government, either.
Olmert has failed to lead. He failed to decide, consider options and choose, to see the complete picture, to follow developments and draw the necessary conclusions. “We approved everything that the military echelon presented us,” he said, but this is not what is expected of a government, says the commission.
The prime minister should have demanded alternatives, decided between a small operation and a large operation, understood that the chief of staff had failed, and replaced him or shortened the war. At least he should have convened the cabinet and discussed these matters seriously, including the looming failure on the horizon and suggestions to make things better. Olmert did not listen or consult, and it is hard to say how he justified his decisions.
Olmert embarked on an operation and found himself at war. The chief of staff did not understand that this was a war, either.
After a whole month, after the home front had been hit by thousands of rockets, when soldiers lacked water and food and bottles of mineral water were being scattered by airplanes all over Lebanon, when the GOC Northern Command wanted to open routes to transport the wounded and food and no one carried out his orders, even though they were issued 13 times, and the entire operation was only a few kilometers from the border – the prime minister decided on a ground operation that the IDF was not ready for, and for which it had not called up reserves in time.
“If the government …, if their prime minister is unable to identify failure and error in real time and make corrections over the course of 34 days, if he cannot tell in advance whether the army is ready for war when he decides on it – he is not fashioned from leadership material.”
In this operation, the fighters stopped fighting even though no order was given to stop, apparently because they understood that there was no one to trust.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to learn to lead. The army can undergo a long process to correct itself, and motivation can be raised by appointing commanders who are more generals than politicians, but in order for someone to want to fight next time – he has to believe he has serious, responsible and functioning leaders.
If the government echelon does not do its homework and throws soldiers into battles for which they are not trained, if their prime minister is unable to identify failure and error in real time and make corrections over the course of 34 days, if he cannot tell in advance whether the army is ready for war when he decides on it – he is not fashioned from leadership material.
Replacing Olmert could deliver the right wing a victory. This is the main reason many people are prepared to ignore his poor performance during the war. The entire gallery of potential leaders is not thrilling, and it is tiresomely familiar. It appears that most of them excel at conducting radio interviews and engaging primarily in political forecasts about governments falling and rising.
Put another way, if the main conclusion of the Winograd Report is that the prime minister is incompetent, not because he made an immoral decision to launch a ground operation at the end of the war but rather because he took no interest at all in whether such an action could succeed – what point is there in awaiting the next crisis?
The Second Lebanon War, whether it was necessary or not, lacked military and governmental leadership. The enemy was inferior in size and means, the timing was reasonable, the weather was convenient, the public was supportive, the world was supportive, the reason to go to war was justified, and the reserve soldiers reported for duty en masse. In their naivete, they thought they had a leadership that knew how to lead.
Analyze This: Olmert Must Look Beyond Mere Survival, Calev Ben-David (Jerusalem Post)
From here on in, though, with the impact of Winograd melting away as fast as the winter snows that fell this week, it will have to prove to the public, especially its own constituencies, that it has some purpose beyond staying in power.
For 18 months the Olmert government has been largely reactive, including in the peace process, where it has been primarily responding to the Bush administration’s initiatives. Taking a more proactive approach – be it a large-scale operation in Gaza, staking out solid positions on final-status issues in the peace talks, evacuating the outposts, even some kind of response to the Iranian nuclear project – carries real risks, political and otherwise, for Olmert, Barak, Livni et al.
Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff Blast Winograd’s Handling of Last Operation, Dr Aaron Lerner (IMRA)
Defense Minister Will Decide on Olmert’s Fate This Weekend, by Gil Hoffman (Jerusalem Post)