What Winograd Missed, by Yehuda Poch (Israel National News)
The ‘Then Maybe They Will’ Doctrine, by Prof. Steven Plaut
(Israel National News)Column One: Statecraft in the Absence of Statesmen, by Caroline Glick (Jerusalem Post)
Commentary (MB)
Yehuda Poch writes about former IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin Shahak’s recent radio interview. The interview came down to one crucial statement;
Shahak: If rocket attacks extend to include Ashkelon, then there might be no choice but to occupy Gaza.
In that one statement, Shahak exposed what is so terribly wrong with the mindset currently gripping Israel’s military and political decision-makers.
And in all the hype generated by the Winograd Commission’s interim findings, it is the one principal cause of last summer’s war that went almost completely unnoticed.
Poch is right, I’ve been screaming on this blog for the longest time about the inequality, the apparent perception of expendability conveyed by successive corrupt regimes — that some Israelis are somehow more valuable while other Israelis, i.e. religious Jews are seen as expendable rif-raf — “asaf suf.”
And I’ve wondered aloud during this most recent Kassam onslaught of Sderot why Sderot’s Jews somehow don’t merit, in the eyes of a corrupt regime and amongst “real” Yosef Q. Israelis, the same priviledge of relief from Kassams as our brethren from the North merited last summer.
Poch continues;
The failures examined by the Winograd Commission, and those continuing to take place regarding the Gaza Strip, did not begin in 2000. They did not begin when the rockets started raining down on Israeli homes and schools. These failures were sown years earlier by political and military leaders – people like Shahak and Barak – who think that we owe the Palestinians anything and that we should be negotiating with the very same people who are currently blowing up our kindergartens.
It is the careless, cowardly attitudes of a succession of Israeli leaders that have allowed our enemies to rain these missiles down on our heads safe in the knowledge that if we do respond, it will be only half-heartedly and not in a way that is likely to cause them much damage. Amnon Lipkin Shahak and Ehud Barak, as well as Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz and Dan Halutz, have worked tirelessly to turn Israel’s military, political and technological might into the laughingstock of the Middle East, and have turned our tiny country into a vast training ground for the next generation of terrorists and their newest weapons.
Poch is right that the failures indicated by Winograd didn’t begin in 2000 with Barak’s South Lebanon withdrawal, but he is only half right regarding other failures which went unnoticed in the Winograd Commission’s interim findings. Professor Steve Plaut, in his piece; The ‘Then Maybe They Will’ Doctrine, has the other half covered.
Dr. Plaut writes;
For the past 30 years, the Israeli political establishment has been a prisoner of the “Then Maybe They Will” doctrine. Each and every major policy decision made by Israel’s political establishment has reflected the power of wishful thinking and faith in the make-pretend.
If Israel gives Sinai back to the Egyptians Then Maybe They Will stop the Nazi-like anti-Semitic propaganda in state-run media. If Israel gives Sinai back to the Egyptians Then Maybe They Will stop the smuggling of explosives and weapons from Egypt to Palestinian terrorists.
If Israel “recognizes” the “Palestinian people,” Then Maybe They Will recognize Israel. If Israel agrees to limited autonomy for “Palestinian” Arabs at Camp David, Then Maybe They Will stop seeking Israel’s destruction, and the world will not try to set up an independent Palestinian Arab terror state.
If Israel recognizes the right of the “Palestinian people” to self-determination, Then Maybe the Arabs Will recognize the right of Jews to self-determination. If Israel grants its Arab citizens affirmative action preferences, Then Maybe They Will stop cheering terrorists and stop seeking the annihilation of Israel and of its Jewish population.
If Israel agrees to hold talks with representatives of the PLO, Then Maybe They Will put a stop to Palestinian terrorism. If Israel agrees to hold talks with representatives of the PLO, Then Maybe They Will suppress the Hamas and Jihad terrorists, and prevent the Hamas from taking power within the “Palestinian Authority.” If Israel holds talks with terrorists, Then Maybe They Will renounce their genocidal ambitions and seek peace.
If Israel provides the “Palestinian Authority” with arms and funds, Then Maybe They Will not be used for terror atrocities against Israel. If Israel officially agrees to let the “Palestinians” have a state, Then Maybe They Will abandon their agenda of annihilating Israel. If Israel turns the Gaza Strip over to the Palestinians, Then Maybe They Will not use it as a base for terror attacks against Israel.
If Israel expels all the Jewish settlers from Gaza as a gesture of friendship towards the Palestinians, Then Maybe They Will reciprocate with friendship towards the Jews. If Israel refrains from retaliating against the Hizbullah terrorists after they murder captive Israeli soldiers in cold blood, Then Maybe They Will not seek to kidnap any more soldiers.
If Israel allows the Palestinians to hold “elections”, Then Maybe They Will not elect the Hamas. If the Palestinians elect the Hamas, Then Maybe Hamas Will not pursue a program of aggression and terrorism against Israel.
If Israel turns the other cheek after Kassam rocket attacks from Gaza, Then Maybe They Will stop being fired. If Israel ignores Hizbullah border violations, Then Maybe They Will stop, too. If Israel conducts a unilateral withdrawal from all of southern Lebanon and allows the Hizbullah to station rockets on the border, Then Maybe They Will not shoot any.
If Israel agrees to evacuate the Jews from the Negev, Then Maybe They Will stop firing Kassam rockets at Israel. If Israel allows the “Palestinian Authority” to control parts of the West Bank, Then Maybe They Will not fire rockets at the Jews the same way they do from Gaza.
If Israeli politicians raise the minimum wage, Then Maybe They Will not thus cause unemployment to skyrocket.
If Israeli politicians arrange for the state to pay for 75% of the costs of Israeli universities, Then Maybe They Will not become centers for anti-Israel leftist sedition.
If Israel grants all religions unlimited freedom in Jerusalem, including Muslim control of the Temple Mount, Then Maybe the World Will acknowledge the legitimacy of Israeli control of the city. If Israel agrees to let the Muslims control the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, Then Maybe They Will respond with friendship and moderation.
If Israel agrees to place its neck in the Oslo noose, Then Maybe the Arabs Will not pull the rope.
For the Winograd Commission to have made an indelible mark on Israel’s political and military leadership and decision-making, its jurisdiction should have been extended to rightly take note of the whole concept of Oslo, of giving the Arabs the money and weaponry to make war, to have even brought Arafat back from the dead in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As Israel allows, agrees, grants… on and on and on, as the viscious cycle of consequences resulting from conscious ommissions of Olmert’s own self-appointed investigate committee continue to play out to this day making national security throughout Israel increasingly tenuous.
Poch wraps up in what can be seen as summation of both articles;
The time has come for Israel’s voters to get rid of all putative “leaders” like Shahak who have instilled in our national consciousness the idea that military or terrorist attacks on some people are acceptable. The blood that has flowed in Israeli streets for the past seven years – or one hundred and seven – continues to cry out for real Jewish justice and not the ignorant cowardice of our leaders.
A related must-read is Caroline Glick’s Column One: Statecraft in the Absence of Statesmen excerpted below.