For comprehensive context on General Udi Adam’s resignation and it’s impact at various levels, click on; Adam’s Resignation May Trigger Domino Effect
Analysis: Will Others Follow Adam? By Yaakov Katz (Jerusalem Post)
Excerpts;
On August 9, OC Northern Command Maj.-Gen. Udi Adam was in the underground command post at his headquarters in Safed, waging another day of war against Hizbullah. In the afternoon, reports began arriving from Dbil about a building that had collapsed and killed nine IDF reservists.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were deployed over the village west of Bint Jbail and began transmitting images of the ruined building and the rescue efforts. A air of depression, one participant recalled Wednesday, spread throughout the command post. Minutes later, Adam convened senior staff to discuss the continuation of the fighting.
“We need to carry on,” Adam told the officers. “I know this is difficult, but we have a responsibility as leaders to carry on and to continue leading our soldiers.”
Several officers in the Northern Command recalled Adam’s talk on Wednesday as they described the type of officer he was and possible motives for his decision to resign from the IDF.
Adam, they said, was a true leader. He knows how to motivate his subordinates and to push them to carry on fighting, as he did after the Dbil incident, and at the same time to take responsibility for his actions, as he did by resigning on Wednesday.
According to officers close to him, after the fighting ended it became clear to Adam that the General Staff was no longer functioning and that the generals were busy preparing themselves for the yet-to-be established inquiry commission.
“Adam couldn’t stand that this is what happened to the military,” one officer said. “Instead of worrying about the soldiers inside Lebanon the generals were busy worrying about the inquiry commissions and the General Staff turned into one big mud fight.”
Now that Adam has resigned, the main question hanging in the air at the Kirya military Headquarters in Tel Aviv and at the Northern Command in Safed concerns the fate of other officers who were no less responsible for the conduct of the war. From the beginning of the fighting in Lebanon, Adam took responsibility for all the army’s successes and failures, and in his letter of resignation to Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz he called on others to follow suit in drawing the necessary conclusions.
The question is, will they? Halutz, officers close to him said Wednesday, does not plan on going anywhere. He does not feel like he should resign – a move that would make him the government’s scapegoat – but rather wants to focus on leading the IDF out of Lebanon and back to its rightful place as one of the most powerful and respected militaries in the world.
What worries him the most, however, is what Adam will say on the day he decides to open his mouth and share with the country his feelings on the way this war was directed by those above him – the chief of staff, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz.
One former chief of staff said Wednesday that the moment Adam says in public that Halutz was the one who signed off on the orders and was behind the decision to delay the ground incursion into Lebanon, as Adam had claimed, the chief of staff will have no choice but to throw in his hat and join Adam at home.
Operation Change of Direction was more than just another war for Udi Adam. His father was Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yekutiel Adam, the former IDF deputy chief of staff, killed in Lebanon in June 1982, during the Peace for Galilee War.
Lebanon has once more claimed an Adam. Not his life this time but his 30-year military career.
And former IDF Chief Moshe Ya’alon weighs in with a claim that “Soldiers were sacrificed for spin.”
Summary;
Ya’alon condemned the decision to launch the ground operation at the end of the war, in which 33 soldiers died.
“‘That was a spin move,’ Ya’alon said. ‘It had no substantive security-political goal, only a spin goal. It was meant to supply the missing victory picture. You don’t do that. You don’t send soldiers to carry out a futile mission after the political outcome has already been set.'”
Ya’alon called for Olmert to resign saying “Even if he was not an army person in the past and was not prime minister or defense minister, he knows how one goes to war. This is not the way to go to war. And he knows how a war is managed…. The war’s management was a failure, and he is responsible for that therefore, he must resign.”
Ya’alon called for the resignations of Halutz and Peretz. He indicates that Halutz misled the political echelon regarding his capability to manage the war and to bring about “bring about a political achievement” through the tactics employed. He blames Peretz saying; “There is a certain justice to what he says about being new and not having time to learn and not even hearing that there were rockets in Lebanon. But the responsibility is on his shoulders in his very agreement to take the job. Both he and the person who appointed him are responsible for appointing an inexperienced person to a sensitive post, without taking into account that within a short time he would have to manage a crisis.”
To view the story that this report follows up on, click here.
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